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Abstract
Text password has long been the dominant user authentication
technique and is used by large numbers of Internet services. If they fol-
low recommended practice, users are faced with the almost insuperable
problem of generating and managing a large number of site-unique and
strong (i.e. non-guessable) passwords. One way of addressing this prob-
lem is through the use of a password generator, i.e. a client-side scheme
which generates (and regenerates) site-specific strong passwords on
demand, with the minimum of user input. This paper provides a
detailed specification and analysis of AutoPass, a password genera-
tor scheme previously outlined as part of a general analysis of such
schemes. AutoPass has been designed to address issues identified in
previously proposed password generators, and incorporates novel tech-
niques to address these issues. Unlike almost all previously proposed
schemes, AutoPass enables the generation of passwords that meet im-
portant real-world requirements, including forced password changes,
use of pre-specified passwords, and generation of passwords meeting
site-specific requirements.
1 Introduction
Despite its widely-discussed shortcomings, text password authentication is
widely used to authenticate users to online services. Many attempts have
been made to replace simple password authentication, e.g. using biometrics,
tokens and multi-factor authentication [4]. However, single-factor password-
based authentication remains very widely used. Moreover, in recent years
the number of widely-used password-protected services has grown signifi-
cantly, in turn increasing the number of passwords users are expected to
remember. There are a range of issues associated with the use of text pass-
words [2]. These issues can be categorized as either user-related or online
service-related. User-related issues include:
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• users are likely to be overwhelmed by the large number of passwords
needed for Internet services, which can lead to use of the same pass-
word for multiple accounts;
• users will often choose guessable passwords, e.g. date of birth, name
of pet, or anniversary date;
• users will often make minimal modifications to an existing password,
e.g. by including a serial number, when forced to make a change.
Online service-related issues, which can make it almost impossible for
users to remember all their passwords, include:
• many sites enforce a complex password policy, e.g. requiring passwords
to contain a minimum number of characters, or include or exclude
specific characters;
• some services force users to change their password regularly, e.g. every
90 days.
To address these issues, a number of password generator schemes have
been proposed [3, 9, 11, 16, 18, 19], which generate strong (i.e. difficult to
guess) and random-looking passwords and regenerate them whenever nec-
essary. In a previous paper [14], we evaluated existing password generator
schemes and discussed their strengths and weaknesses; this analysis enabled
us to outline a new scheme which we called AutoPass. AutoPass is an
on-demand password generator which generates site-specific passwords for
online services. It combines features from existing password generators with
novel techniques designed to address identified shortcomings in the exist-
ing schemes. In this paper we provide the first detailed specification of
AutoPass, and also give a detailed analysis of its properties.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines
what we mean by password generators, and gives a general model for such
schemes (based closely on [14]). Section 3 then gives a high-level description
of AutoPass, building on the outline previously provided. This is followed
in section 4 by a detailed specification of the operation of AutoPass. Sec-
tion 5 provides an analysis of the properties of AutoPass, and in particular
highlights how it addresses known shortcomings of such schemes. Finally,
the paper concludes in section 6.
2 A General Model
2.1 Definition
This paper is concerned with password generators, i.e. schemes designed
to simplify password management for end users by generating site-specific
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passwords on demand from a small set of readily-memorable inputs. Note
that the term has also been used to describe schemes for generating random
or pseudorandom passwords which the user is then expected to remember;
however, we use the term to describe a system intended to be used whenever
a user logs in and that can generate the necessary passwords on demand and
in a repeatable way. A variety of such schemes have been proposed in recent
years.
In this section we present a general model for such schemes, which we use
later in this paper as the basis for describing our novel scheme, AutoPass
[14]. We observe that the general class of such schemes has been briefly
considered previously by McCarney [15] under the name generative password
managers.
2.2 A Model
A password generator has the following components.
• A set of input values is used to determine the password for a particular
site. Some values must be site-specific so that the generated password
is site-specific. The values could be stored (locally or online), based
on characteristics of the authenticating site, or user-entered when re-
quired. Systems can, and often do, combine these types of input.
• A password generation function combines the input values to generate
an appropriate password. This function could operate in a range of
ways depending on the requirements of the web site performing the
authentication. For example, one web site might forbid the inclusion
of non-alphanumeric characters in a password, whereas another might
insist that a password contains at least one such character. To be
broadly applicable, a password generation function must therefore be
customisable.
• A password output method enables the generated password to be trans-
ferred to the authenticating site. This could, for example, involve dis-
playing the generated password to the user, who must then type (or
copy and paste) it into the appropriate place.
All this functionality needs to be implemented on the user platform.
There are various possibilities for such an implementation, including as a
stand-alone application or as a browser plug-in.
2.3 Examples
Before proceeding we briefly outline some existing proposals for password
generation schemes conforming to the above model. The schemes are pre-
sented in chronological order of publication.
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• The Site-Specific Passwords (SSP) scheme proposed by Karp [9] in
2002/03 is one of the earliest proposed schemes of this general type.
SSP generates a site-specific password by combining a long-term user
master password and an easy-to-remember name for the web site, as
chosen by the user.
• PwdHash, due to Ross et al. [16], generates a site-specific password
by combining a long-term user master password, data associated with
the web site, and (optionally) a second global password stored on the
platform.
• The 2005 Password Multiplier scheme of Halderman, Waters and Fel-
ten, [3], computes a site-specific password as a function of a long-term
user master password, the web site name, and the user name for the
web site concerned.
• Wolf and Schneider’s 2006 PasswordSitter [18] generates a site-specific
password as a function of a long-term user master password, the user
identity, the application/service name, and some configurable param-
eters.
• Passpet, due to Yee and Sitaker [19] and also published in 2006, takes
a very similar approach to SSP, i.e. the site-specific password is a
function of a long-term user master password and a user-chosen name
for the web site known as a petname. Each petname has an associated
icon, which is automatically displayed to the user and is intended to
reduce the risk of phishing attacks.
• ObPwd, due to Mannan et al. [1, 11, 12, 13], first surfaced in 2008.
It takes a somewhat different approach by generating a site-specific
password as a function of a user-selected (site-specific) object (e.g.
a file), together with a number of optional parameters, including a
long-term user password (referred to as a salt), and the web site URL.
• Finally, PALPAS [5] generates passwords complying with site-specific
requirements using server-provided password policy data, a stored se-
cret master password (the seed), and a user-specific secret value (the
salt) that is synchronised across all the user devices using the server.
There are also widely available applications conforming to the general
model, examples of which we briefly mention below. The following schemes
are available as browser extensions.
• RndPhrase1 is a Firefox add-on and web-based password generator.
It generates site-specific passwords as a function of a predefined salt
1https://rndphrase.appspot.com/
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(unique per user), the host name, and a user-entered password. The
user only needs to remember the password.
• PwdHash port2 is an Opera add-on based on PwdHash.
Android Phone App: The following two apps are available for Android mo-
bile phones.
• Advanced password generator3 generates passwords which can be copied
and shared. The form of a generated password, e.g. its length and
character(s) to include/exclude, can be configured.
• Password generator4 generates passwords as a function of a config-
urable set of parameters including a user salt. The system indicates
its estimate of the strength of the generated password.
2.4 Registration and Configuration
In this paper we are interested in schemes whose operation is completely
transparent to the website which is authenticating the user. As a result, the
‘normal’ website registration procedure, in which the user selects a password
and sends it to the site, is assumed to be used. This, in turn, typically means
that password generation needs to take place before user registration with
a site, or at least that introduction of the password generator requires the
user to modify their account password. This requirement causes problems
with all the previously proposed password generator schemes, as we discuss
in section 2.5 below.
There is a potential need for a password generator to store configuration
data. Such data can be divided into two main types:
• user-specific configuration data, i.e. values unique to the user and
which are used to help generate all passwords for that user, e.g. a
master password; and
• site-specific configuration data, i.e. values used to help generate pass-
words for a specific website, which are typically the same for all users,
e.g. a password policy.
Not all schemes use configuration data, although producing a workable sys-
tem without at least some user-specific configuration data seems challenging.
However, the use of configuration data is clearly a major barrier to porta-
bility. That is, for a user employing multiple platforms, the configuration
data must be kept synchronised across all these platforms, a non-trivial task
— exactly the issue addressed in a recent paper by Horsch, Hu¨lsing and
Buchmann [6].
2https://addons.opera.com/en-gb/extensions/details/pwdhash-port/
3https://goo.gl/MF0z1D
4https://goo.gl/SNVtJY
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2.5 Issues with existing schemes
Before describing the detailed operation of AutoPass, we observe certain
fundamental problems that affect all (or almost all) previously proposed
password generators. These issues motivate the design of AutoPass, which
incorporates novel features designed to overcome these problems.
Setting and updating passwords As noted above, if a user is already
using the password generator when newly registering with a website,
there is clearly no problem — the user can simply register whatever
value the system generates. However, if the user has selected and
registered passwords with a range of websites before starting use of the
password generator, then all these passwords will need to be changed
to whatever the password generator outputs. This could be highly
inconvenient if a user has established relationships with many sites,
and could present a formidable barrier to adoption of the system.
Somewhat analogous problems arise if a user decides to change a web-
site password, e.g. because the site enforces periodic password changes.
The only possibility for the user will be to change one of the inputs
used to generate the password, e.g. the object (if a digital object is
used as an input) or a user site name. Password change could even
be impossible if the user does not choose any of the inputs used to
generate a password.
Using multiple platforms If a user employs multiple platforms, e.g. a
desktop and a smart phone, then problems will arise if any locally-
stored configuration data is used.
Password policy issues A further general problem relates to the need to
automatically generates passwords in a site-specific form, a problem
not satisfactorily addressed by any of the previously proposed schemes
except PALPAS. Some existing schemes have the option for the user
to customise a generated password, but the user has to identify the
requirements for the website manually and configure the options ac-
cordingly. Automatically generating a password tailored to meet a
websites specific requirements has been explored extensively by Horsch
and his co-authors [12, 13].
3 AutoPass: Instantiating the Model
3.1 AutoPass Components
AutoPass has two main components: the AutoPass server and the AutoPass
client software. The AutoPass server is used to store relatively non-sensitive
user data, e.g. the user name and website-specific password policies (i.e.
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specifications of the types of password a particular site will accept). The
AutoPass client software provides a user interface, and automatically gen-
erates site-specific user passwords as a combination of the specified set of
inputs. Some of the inputs are stored locally and some are stored in the Au-
toPass server, with which the client software interacts as necessary. Where
possible, the generated password is automatically inserted into login forms.
Figure 1 depicts the AutoPass architecture, showing the main compo-
nents of the scheme.
Figure 1: AutoPass System Architecture
3.2 Overview
We next provide a high level description of AutoPass, based on the general
model provided in the previous section. We first describe the three main
components of the scheme, i.e. the input values, the password generation
function, and the output method, together with an initial approach to im-
plementation.
• Input values. We propose the use of a range of types of input, as
listed below, incorporating those used in previous schemes.
– A master password, i.e. a long-term strong password selected
by the user or generated by the system. The master password is
stored in encrypted form on the AutoPass server as part of the
user-specific configuration data for that user. Since it does not
need to be remembered by the user, this could, for example, be
a 128-bit random value. The precise choice is implementation-
dependent. The user might wish to make a written record of
this value when it is initially chosen, and store it securely for
backup/recovery purposes.
– The site name is the URL of the site for which the software is
generating a password. To overcome the issue of changes to URL
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sub-domains, AutoPass only uses the first part of the URL (i.e.
up to the first / character ).
– A password policy specifies the set of site-specific requirements
for a password (e.g. including a length constraint and/or setting
minimum numbers of certain classes of character). Many web-
sites enforce highly specific policies, reflecting somewhat ad hoc
decisions made by system designers. The policy is specified using
the Password Requirements Markup Language (PRML) [6].
– A digital object is a text fragment, picture, or audio sample,
typically in the form of a digital file. This is an optional input that
potentially adds significant entropy to the password generation
process, e.g. for use when generating passwords protecting high-
value resources.
• In the password generation stage, the input values are combined to
produce the desired site-specific password. This process occurs in two
stages, as follows.
– The first stage involves combining the input values, including the
master password and the URL, to produce a bit string. Follow-
ing Kelsey et al. [10], this computation involves a two-level hash
computation, as follows.
1. The site-independent input (namely the master password) is
submitted to a cryptographic hash-function, e.g. SHA-256,
[7]. The hash-function is iterated a significant number of
times, e.g. 1000, where the number is chosen to be as large as
possible without making the client software too unresponsive.
This number can be user-dependent, as long as the value is
held in the server to enable it to be synchronised across all
the platforms for a particular user. The output, e.g. a 256-bit
string, is then cached in the client software. Since this value
is independent of the website, it can be computed once when
the client software is started up and cached locally while the
client software is active.
2. The 256-bit string is concatenated with the website-specific
inputs (the site name and the optional digital object) and
hashed once more using the same hash-function to yield a
site-specific bit string.
The use of a two-level process is designed to give some protection
against brute force attacks by slowing them down. Suppose an
opponent knows a site-specific password and wishes to use this to
learn the user’s master password by searching through all possi-
bilities. Of course, if the master password is a randomly chosen
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128-bit string then there is no danger of such a search succeeding,
but some users may not select their master passwords to possess
high entropy. In such a case, it might be possible to work through
all possibilities for the master password until the correct value is
found. However, use of a multiply-iterated hash-function means
that such a brute force search will involve significantly more com-
putational effort than it otherwise would; at the same time, since
the iterated part is only computed once per session, the additional
load on the genuine client will be manageable.
– The second stage (encoding) involves taking the bit string output
from the first stage and constructing from it a password of the
desired form, using the PRML policy specification to ensure the
password meets the website-specific requirements. Other possible
inputs to this encoding step include the password offset. How
encoding operates is discussed in detail in section 3.4 below.
• Password output and use is achieved by automatically copying the
generated password to the targeted password field. AutoPass uses
secure filling techniques to prevent sweeping attacks [17].
We propose to implement AutoPass (at least initially) as a browser add-on.
This will enable us to automate key tasks, including fetching the website
URL and inserting passwords into login forms. In the future, for use with
platforms not permitting such add-ons, we plan to examine both stand-alone
applications and web-based functionality.
3.3 Stored Data
As we have described, AutoPass needs access to a variety of configuration
data to enable it to operate automatically, and this configuration data clearly
needs to be stored somewhere. There are two possible locations for data
storage, namely the AutoPass server and the AutoPass client, and AutoPass
uses both. The configuration data stored at the server is held long-term,
i.e. for the lifetime of the user account at the server; the data held on the
client may be held either short-term, typically for the life of a session, or
long-term, i.e. while the software remains installed on the client platform.
We summarise below the various types of stored data.
3.3.1 Server-stored data
The following user-specific configuration data is held at the AutoPass server:
• the user account name;
• an email address for the user;
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• the (encrypted) master password;
• a hash of the master password;
• a (salted) hash of the session password
• for each website for which a password has been generated for this user:
– the (first part) of the URL of the website;
– the types of input used to generate the password for this site;
– the password offset for this site (see section 3.5)
The following site-specific configuration data is held at the AutoPass
server:
• the (first part) of the URL of the website;
• the password policy of the site, encoded in PRML (see section 3.4);
Note that the site-specific configuration data could be maintained by a
server separate from that used to store the user-specific configuration data.
Indeed, since this data is completely non-confidential, it could be provided by
a service independent of AutoPass, e.g. the Password Requirements Descrip-
tion Distribution Service (PRDDS)[6], which provides an online interface to
meet requests for PRML-based Password Requirements Descriptors (PRDs)
for websites identified by their URL.
3.3.2 Client-stored data
The following data is held long-term by the AutoPass client:
• cached copies of password policies for recently visited websites.
The following data is held short-term by the AutoPass client:
• the session password;
• a multiply-iterated hash of the master password (see section 3.2).
3.4 PRML
The Password Requirements Markup Language (PRML) [6] is an XML-
based syntax that can be used to specify site-specific password requirements,
including minimum and maximum lengths, the permissible character set,
and minimum required number(s) of specific sub-classes of characters. It
has been designed to address the diversity of password requirements arising
in practice, and enable password generators to automatically generate site-
specific passwords that match online service password requirements.
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The PRML specification for a website provides one of the two inputs
for the second stage of password generation described in section 3.2, the
other being the bit string output from the first stage. The second stage of
password generation operates as follows.
1. The size C of the password character set is derived from the PRML
specification; we suppose that a mapping is chosen from the set of
integers {0, 1, . . . , C − 1} to the characters in the password character
set.
2. The length L of the password is chosen to be the minimum of 16 and
the minimum length prescribed by the PRML policy.
3. The input bit string is converted to a positive integer (by regarding
the string as the binary representation of a number), and this number
is converted to its C-ary representation dtdt−1 . . . d0, for some t, where
0 ≤ di ≤ C − 1 for every i (0 ≤ i ≤ t).
4. The final L digits of the above sequence of numbers, i.e. dL−1dL−2 . . . d0,
are then converted to characters using the mapping established in step
1.
5. The password is tested to verify that it satisfies the other constraints
in the PRML specification. If not, then the input bit string is rehashed
and the process is recommenced; otherwise the process is complete.
The above procedure operates on the assumption that the length of the
input bit string is significantly greater than dL log2Ce. Since the likely value
of L is 16, and a typical value for C is at most 64, this means that dL log2Ce
is likely to be less than 100, i.e. much less than the length of the output of a
modern hash function such as SHA-256 (which gives a 256-bit output). It is
also based on the assumption that a random password with characters from
the specified password set has a reasonable chance of satisfying the PRML
requirements. If this latter assumption is not true, then a more elaborate
second stage algorithm could be devised.
3.5 Password Offsets
As noted in section 2.5, one major issue with existing password generation
schemes is that they do not provide a facility for a user to choose a pass-
word (e.g. to allow continuing use of a password established prior to use
of AutoPass), or to change a password without changing the set of inputs.
We propose the use of password offsets to support these requirements. A
password offset works in the following way.
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1. A password dL−1dL−2 . . . d0 is first generated in the normal two-stage
way (as described in section 3.4), and suppose D is the positive integer
which has dL−1dL−2 . . . d0 as its C-ary representation.
2. Let the user-chosen password (of length M , say) be encoded as a se-
quence of M digits eM−1eM−2 . . . e0, where 0 ≤ ei ≤ C − 1 for every
i (0 ≤ i ≤ M − 1), and suppose E is the positive integer which has
eM−1eM−2 . . . e0 as its C-ary representation.
3. The password offset is simply E −D.
When generating a password, if a password offset exists then the password
can simply be generated in the normal way and the offset added, and the
result will be the C-ary encoding of the desired password. A similar ap-
proach can be used to force a password change, where a new password can
be generated at random (in accordance with the PRML specification) and
the password offset can be set to the difference between the new password
and the value generated using the standard procedure.
4 Details of Operation
4.1 General
We next provide details of the operation of AutoPass, including: application
installation and setup, operational sessions, initial use with a website, and
subsequent use with a website. Note that, to simplify the discussion, we
assume that AutoPass is implemented as a browser add-on running on a
Windows platform. Alternative implementation scenarios, e.g. as a stand-
alone application on a phone or tablet, are likely to be very similar, but may
vary in some minor details.
4.2 Application Installation
We divide this discussion into two cases, i.e. where a user installs AutoPass
for the first time (and creates an account on the AutoPass server), and where
a user installs the software on an additional platform and already has an
AutoPass account.
4.2.1 First Installation and Account Creation
We first describe the case where a user decides to start using AutoPass, and
wishes to install and set up the client software. Once the AutoPass add-on
is installed, the ensuing set-up procedure involves the following steps.
1. When the AutoPass add-on is activated for the first time, e.g. when the
user clicks a toolbar button, it first asks the user whether he/she has
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an existing account. In this case the user indicates that a new account
is to be created. Creating a new account involves the client software
contacting the AutoPass server, and various registration details need
to be completed. In particular, registration involves gathering the fol-
lowing pieces of information: session password, user name, and master
password.
(a) Session password: This is chosen and entered by the user, who
must memorise it. It serves two main purposes: user authenti-
cation and the derivation of a key used for encrypting the copy
of the master password stored at the server. After entry of the
session password, the client computes a salted hash of the value,
which is sent to the AutoPass server as a means of authenticating
the user in later sessions.
(b) User name: The user must select a unique name. The AutoPass
server checks that the name is not already in use, and if necessary
requests the user to choose a different value. The user name is
stored by the AutoPass server, and serves as an identifier for the
user.
(c) Master password: This value, which essentially functions as a
cryptographic key, can be generated by the user or the AutoPass
client software (perhaps at the choice of the user). We assume for
the purposes of this description that the master password is a 128-
bit value, represented as a string of 32 hexadecimal characters. If
the client software generates it, it should be displayed to the user
and the user should be advised to keep a copy somewhere secure
so that system recovery is possible (see section 4.2.3 below). The
session password is used to generate a cryptographic key, e.g. by
hashing the concatenation of the session password and a fixed
value. This key is then used to encrypt the master password
using an appropriate symmetric encryption technique, e.g. AES
[8] in an authenticated encryption mode, prior to uploading it to
the server. The server retains this encrypted master password for
downloading to a client whenever a user logs in. The AutoPass
client also generates a hash of the master password, which is sent
to the AutoPass server and stored with the encrypted copy; this
hash value is only used for recovery purposes (see section 4.2.3).
(d) Other information: To complete registration, and to allow for
recovery in the event of a user forgetting his or her user name
or password, an email address (or addresses) should also be col-
lected. Other contact details could also be given, e.g. a mobile
number. The server holds this information as part of the user
account information.
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2. After successful user account creation, the user is requested to log in
using his or her newly established user name and session password (see
section 4.3).
4.2.2 Installing AutoPass on a newly Acquired PC
Once an AutoPass account has been established (as described immediately
above), the following steps are followed to set up AutoPass on a new ma-
chine. We suppose that the client software has been installed on the plat-
form.
1. As previously, when the AutoPass add-on is activated for the first
time, it first asks the user whether he/she has an existing account. In
this case the user indicates that he/she already has an account. The
AutoPass client then asks the user for his or her user name and session
password, and the process continues exactly as in a normal operational
session (see section 4.3).
4.2.3 Recovery
The system needs to provide a recovery mechanism for the case where a
user forgets their user name and/or password. We suppose that the client
software has a recovery function, which a user can invoke in the event of a
forgotten user name or password. We consider the operation of this recovery
function for the two cases separately.
• If a user forgets their user name, he or she can request a copy from the
server by entering their registered email address. The server checks
that the email address is registered, and then sends the user name for
this address to the user via email.
• If a user forgets their session password, then it cannot be recovered
since neither the server nor the client retain a copy. However, if the
user has kept a copy of the master password, then system recovery
is possible using the following procedure. The user is prompted to
enter his or her user name and the master password. The user is also
prompted to select a new session password. The session password is
used to generate a key which is used to encrypt the master password,
exactly as described in section 4.2.1. A hash of the newly selected
session password, the user name, the encrypted master password, and
a hash of the master password are all sent to the AutoPass server.
The AutoPass server authenticates the user by comparing the master
password hash with its stored value, and if successful replaces the
current encrypted master password and session password hash with the
newly supplied values. Finally, the server communicates the success of
the recovery operation to the AutoPass client, which informs the user.
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4.3 Operational Sessions
We next consider what occurs when the AutoPass software is activated, e.g.
after the host platform has been rebooted. We suppose that the set-up
process described in section 4.2 has already been performed.
1. The user is prompted for his or her user name and session password.
2. The user name is sent to the AutoPass server, which responds with
the salt value for its stored copy of the hashed session password for
the identified user.
3. The AutoPass client software uses the salt value to hash the session
password entered by the user, and the resulting hash-value is sent to
the server.
4. The AutoPass server checks that the session password hash is the same
as its stored value, and by doing so authenticates the user.
5. The AutoPass server sends back to the client the encrypted master
password. The AutoPass server also sends the following information
for each site for which the user has created a password using AutoPass:
• the first part of the URL of the site (this is used as the site
identifier);
• the password policy for the site (in PRML);
• the set of input types used to generate the password for this site
(e.g. whether a digital object is used);
• the password offset for this site, if it exists;
• any other parameters used to control the generation of the pass-
word for this site.
6. The AutoPass client decrypts the master password using a key derived
from the session password, and multiply hashes the master password;
the result is cached and the master password can then be deleted.
7. Once activated, the AutoPass add-on will run continuously in the back-
ground, examining each web page to see if it is a login page. It does
this by using various heuristics, including looking for the string input
type=“password”.
8. The add-on will then work as required, generating passwords automat-
ically, until the session ends, e.g. when the browser is terminated.
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4.4 Initial Use with a New Website
When AutoPass is used with a new website, the following procedure is exe-
cuted. We suppose that the AutoPass software is already executing, i.e. the
procedure in 4.3 has been followed.
1. If the AutoPass add-on detects a login page, it cross-checks the first
part of the site URL with the data downloaded from the AutoPass
server to determine whether it is a site for which it has already gen-
erated a password. In this case, we suppose that it has not previously
been used to generate a password for this site.
2. The AutoPass add-on then communicates with the user by some means
(e.g. via a pop-up) to indicate that it has detected a login page for a
website for which a password has not previously been generated, and
asks the user whether it would like AutoPass to manage generation of
a new password for this site.
3. If the user declines, then the AutoPass add-on goes back to looking
for login pages. If the user accepts, AutoPass next asks what types of
input the user would like to use to generate the password from amongst
those listed in section 3.2.
4. The user selects the types of input to be used and, if the use of digital
objects is selected, the user is also asked to select such an object. The
AutoPass client assembles the set of inputs, including the first part
of the website URL and the multiply-hashed master password, to be
used to generate the site password. The AutoPass client also offers
the user the option to select the password — if the user requests this
option then the user is prompted for the pre-chosen value.
5. The password is generated using the procedure specified in sections
3.2 and 3.5 and automatically copied to the password field. If the user
chose to select the password value, then the appropriate password
offset is computed during password generation.
6. The user preferences and the password offset (if appropriate) are sent
to the AutoPass server for storage.
4.5 Subsequent Use with a Website (Everyday Use)
The following steps are executed when AutoPass is in everyday use, i.e. after
a website has already been set-up, as in section 4.4. As in section 4.4, we
suppose that the client AutoPass software is already active.
1. If the AutoPass add-on detects a login page, it uses the first part of the
site URL to check whether a password has previously been generated
for this site — in this case we suppose it has.
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2. The AutoPass add-on then assembles the set of inputs to be used to
generate the password; if the user preferences for this site indicate
that a digital object is to be used, the add-on prompts the user for the
object.
3. The AutoPass add-on then generates the password, using the password
offset if available, and automatically copies the generated value to the
password field.
4.6 Other Aspects
4.6.1 Client-server communications
Whilst the data exchanged between AutoPass client and server is not nec-
essarily highly confidential, some is privacy-sensitive and the integrity of
all the data is crucial for correct operation. We therefore propose that
all data exchanged between client and server is protected using a server-
authenticated TLS channel established at the beginning of a client session.
To make the authentication of server to client robust, the client is assumed
to use certificate pinning for the server.
4.6.2 Client caching
The set of website data downloaded by the AutoPass server to the AutoPass
client at the beginning of every session (see step 5 of section 4.3) is not likely
to change very rapidly. It therefore makes sense for the client to cache the
most recently downloaded copy of this data, potentially improving system
availability even if the AutoPass server is unavailable for a period.
5 Evaluation
We next consider the security properties of the scheme.
5.1 Trust relationships
Clearly, the AutoPass server must be trusted to some extent by the user,
since if it sends incorrect data then passwords cannot be generated correctly.
It also learns which websites the user interacts with, and hence it must be
trusted to respect user privacy. On the other hand, it does not have the
means to learn user passwords, since it only has access to an encrypted copy
of the master password, which is used to generate all passwords, and thus
it can be regarded as being partially trusted.
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5.2 Threat model
The security and correct operation of AutoPass depends on a number of key
assumptions, which we enumerate.
• The client device is assumed to be uncompromised, since passwords
are generated in and used by this device. If, for example, the browser
is compromised then clearly the generated passwords may be compro-
mised.
• The AutoPass client is assumed to be correct and without exploitable
vulnerabilities. As for the previous assumption, if a corrupted ver-
sion of the client software is present on the client device, then user
passwords may be compromised.
• The AutoPass server provides correct information (see also section 5,1
above).
Given the above assumptions, AutoPass is designed to resist the following
types of attack:
1. active attacks on the communications link between the AutoPass client
and server, including masquerading as the server to the client or vice
versa, e.g. as made possible by an untrustworthy wireless access point
or by DNS poisoning;
2. attacks on password secrecy conducted by the AutoPass server;
3. attacks on password secrecy conducted by a valid site against user
passwords for other sites;
4. attacks on password secrecy conducted by any party with temporary
access to the AutoPass server database.
5.3 Security properties
We conclude this discussion by considering whether the desired properties
are realised by the AutoPass design. We consider the four attacks in the
previous section in turn.
1. Attacks of the first type are prevented by the assumption that all
communications between the client and server are TLS-protected. The
server will be authenticated by a pinned certificate. The client end of
the link will not be explicitly authenticated to the server, but the
presence of the correct user is verified by checking that the correct
hash of the session password is sent over the link.
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2. The server only has access to password metadata, a hash of the master
password, and an encrypted copy of the master password. If the mas-
ter password is automatically generated by a process using sufficient
randomness, use of a 128-bit value will prevent direct brute forcing
guessing attacks. However, the encryption of the master password is
based on a key derived from the user-selected session password. If the
session password is poorly chosen, then it can be brute-forced, mean-
ing that the server could gain access to the master password. Thus it
is vital for the user to choose a session password with high entropy.
This is a reasonable assumption since this is the only secret the user
is required to memorise. It is also worth noting that the use of pass-
word offsets means that if a password (and its offset) are compromised
then all future passwords for that particular site can be determined if
the offset is known. That is, whilst offsets will not be divulged to any
party, a dishonest AutoPass server that (by some means) learns a users
password for a website will be able to determine all future passwords
for that site.
3. The AutoPass system is completely transparent to authenticating web-
sites. If a website guesses that AutoPass is in use, it could use the
password to try to perform a brute force search for the master pass-
word. However, if the master password is chosen at random then such
a search is infeasible.
4. If an unauthorised party has access to the AutoPass server database,
then it will not have immediate access to any user passwords. However,
as discussed under 2 above, if the unauthorised party obtains the en-
crypted master password and the session password used to encrypt the
master password is poorly chosen, then the attacker might be able to
brute-force the session password and learn the master password. This
argues in favour of the AutoPass server providing additional encryp-
tion of the database, giving protection against compromise of stored
user data.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have described in detail the design of the AutoPass password
generator. Its use of a server, in particular to store password offsets, PRML
specifications and user preferences, avoids the shortcomings present in all
previously proposed password generators. At the same time, this server is
only partly trusted, and does not have the means to recover individual user
passwords, as discussed in section 5. Of course, whilst the system works
in theory, it remains to verify that the system will work in practice. A
prototype implementation of AutoPass is being developed, and this will be
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used to conduct user trials, to verify that the desired high level of usability
can be achieved. We hope to report on these trials in a future paper.
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